

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OMB-01 AID-20 DRC-01 ARA-16 IO-14 NEA-10

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R 111040Z MAR 74 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2532
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 3199

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: OVIP

SUBJECT: DEPSEC'S VISIT TO SAIGON

1. FOLLOWING IS CLEARED SUMMARY OF DEPSEC'S CONVERSATION
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BAC MARCH6.

2. INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION AND RECOGNITION: FOREIGN
MINISTER BAC OUTLINED GVN EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN ITS FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND COUNTER PRG TACTICS WHICH HAD HAD SOME SUCCESS
IN THIRD WORLD AREAS WHICH GVN HAD NEGLECTED, HE FELT. BAC
LEAVES THIS WEEK TO ATTEND INAUGURATION NEW BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT
FOLLOWING WHICH HE WILL TRAVEL IN LATIN AMERICA WITH VIEW
TO IMPROVING SOUTH VIETNAM'S CONTACTS AND RELATIONS WITH
SELECTED COUNTRIES. PARTLY FOR FINANCIAL REASONS, GVN HAS
ONLY TWO EMBASSIES IN LATIN AMERICA BUT BAC PLANNING
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TO REPLACE CHARGES WITH AMBASSADORS IN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA

AND PERHAPS TO ESTABLISH EMBASSIES IN CHILE AND VENEZUELA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

ADDITIONALLY ENVOY BEING SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA WITH WHICH GVN HAS JUST ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. HE WILL VISIT NEIGHBORING STATES IN MID EAST AND A VISIT TO AFRICA WILL FOLLOW IN EFFORT TO DEVELOP FURTHER RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE, CAR, TOGO, SIERRA LEONE, KENYA, NIGERIA AND PERHAPS OTHERS.

BAC THANKED US FOR ITS SUPPORT IN BARRING PRG FROM LAW OF WAR CONFERENCE IN GENEVA AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT REMAINING CREDENTIALS QUESTION COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY HANDLED. HE CITED ABOVE MENTIONED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE GVN'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS EXAMPLE OF TAKING INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN GVN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND DECREASE PROSPECTS FOR PRG "WRESTING RECOGNITION" FROM COUNTRIES OR INTERNATIONAL BODIES.

3. EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS: AMBASSADOR MARTIN CREDIT MR. BAC FOR PERSUADING PRESIDENT THIEU TO CARRY OUT EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS WITH NORTH VIETNAM. MR BAC EXPLAINED THAT ISSUE HAD BEEN DEADLOCKED FOR PROCEDURAL REASONS AND WAS READILY EXPLOITABLE BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. DEPUTY SECRETARY STATED THAT HE, PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAD BEEN PLEASED AND IMPRESSED BY COURAGE SHOWN BY SOUTH VIETNAM IN ACCEPTING THE UNEQUAL EXCHANGE AND NOTED THAT THIS INITIATIVE WOULD STRENGTHEN SOUTH VIETNAM'S IMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

4. ECONOMIC: BAC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GVN ECONOMY WAS SEVERELY STRAINED AND THAT SERIOUS PROBLEMS AROSE FROM CONFLUENCE OF RISING PRICES FOR ESSENTIAL IMPORTS (FOOD, FERTILIZER AND FUEL) AND IMMENSE COST OF MAINTAINING ARMY OF MORE THAN ONE MILLION MEN. BAC FELT NORTH VIETNAM FACING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AS WELL AND PROBABLY COULD NOT SUSTAIN PRESSURE ON SOUTH VIETNAM INDEFINITELY.

HOWEVER, SOUTH VIETNAM CRITICALLY NEEDED ADDITIONAL AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IMMEDIATELY AND WAS HOPEFUL THAT DLF LOAN COULD BE ARRANGED AND THE GAP CLOSED BETWEEN FY 74 APPROPRIATIONS AND AUTHORIZATION.

DEPUTY SECRETARY STATED THAT EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN FULL AGREEMENT AND WOULD EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT.

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5. SOUTH VIETNAM RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS: MR. BAC DESCRIBED GVN RELATIONS WITH ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. CAMBODIA WAS A MAIN WORRY WITH SHELLING OF PHNOM PENH HAVING MORALE BACKLASH IN VIETNAM SINCE IT SUGGESTED A SET BACK IN THE ANTI-COMMUNIST CAUSE. SOUTH VIETNAM WAS WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE IN WHAT DIRECTION THE NEW THAI GOVERNMENT WOULD GO, BUT HAD NOT LET CHANGES THERE AFFECT ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS. MR BAC UNHAPPY WITH RECENT INDONESIAN ACTIONS ON TWO SCORES: MALIK'S

CRITICISM OF SOUTH VIETNAM ACTIVITIES IN PARACEL/SPRATLY ISLANDS AND SUPPORT FOR PRG CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY; AND GOI VOTE FOR PRG AT LAW OF WAR CONFERENCE IN GENEVA WHICH IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO INDONESIA WALKOUT FROM GEORGETOWN NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN 1972 ON THE SAME ISSUE.

DEPUTY SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IN CONVERSATION IN JAKARTA HE HAD NOT DETECTED ANY INDONESIAN ANIMUS AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM. HE HAD PROTESTED GOI VOTE IN GENEVA TO BOTH SUHARTO AND MALIK. LATTER CLAIMED THAT INDONESIAN VOTE DID NOT SIGNAL ANY INTENTION TO RECOGNIZE PRG BUT RATHER REJECTED DESIRE TO HAVE PRG BOUND BY LAW OF WAR AGREEMENTS.

FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT PRESENT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN LESS THAN FRIENDLY TO SOUTH VIETNAM AND ASKED WHETHER QUESTION OF US BASES IN AREA HAD BEEN RAISED IN WELLINGTON OR CANBERRA.

MR RUSH REPLIED THAT IT HAD NOT AND REVIEWED RECENT ANZUS MEETING, NOTING AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND DETERMINATION TO KEEP ANZUS ALLIANCE ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE AND BROADENED TO INCLUDE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MATTERS. HE ALSO NOTED AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND STRONG INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

6. INTERNAL SITUATION: MR BAC COMMENTED THAT MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS LESS SERIOUS THAN ECONOMIC SITUATION. SOUTH VIETNAM HAD NOT CREATED PARACEL ISSUE BUT IT HAD HELPED THE GOVERNMENT IN CREATING GENUINE POPULAR ISSUE BUT IT HAD HELPED THE GOVERNMENT IN CREATING GENUINE POPULAR ANGER AT PRC AND AROUSING CONSIDERABLE NATIONALIST FERVOR. IN RESPONSE TO COMMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN, MR BAC SAID THAT IMPORTANCE OF "THIRD FORCE" MOVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAD BEEN GROSSLY EXAGGERATED BY THE PRESS AND THAT COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL ON THIS ISSUE HAD GOT NO WHERE. VIET CONG HAD HE FELT INCREASED THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES BUT NOT THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE. THEIR FAILURE TO MAKE INROADS, ESPECIALLY IN CITIES
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HAD CAUSED THEM TO REVERT TO THEIR FORMER TACTIC OF KIDNAPPING VILLAGERS.

MR BAC ADDED HOWEVER THAT UPCOMING ECAFE MEETING IN SRILANKA AND A LATER WHO MEETING COULD POSE MAJOR TESTS OF STRENGTH ON PRG RECOGNITION AND HE WAS FORMULATING STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THESE MATTERS.

US (MR RUSH AND MR HUMMEL) AFFIRMED US SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IN THESE EFFORTS. MR HUMMEL ASKED WHETHER USE COULD BE MADE OF FACT NORTH VIETNAM WAS UNWILLING TO ACCREDIT AN AMBASSADOR TO THE PRG.

MR BAC SAID PRG ALSO HAS NO DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HANOI BUT GVN DOES NOT WANT TO USE THIS POINT BECAUSE IT WOULD INVOLVE SAYING PRG IS A STATE. IN THIS CONNECTION DEPUTY SECRETARY WONDERED HOW HANOI RECONCILED ITS POSITION IN SUPPORT OF PRG AS A SOVEREIGN MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

WITH ITS CONTENTION THAT VIETNAM SHOULD BE ONE STATE UNDER ONE GOVERNMENT.

7. ICCS: MR HUMMEL EXPRESSED US CONCERN ABOUT CONTRIBUTIONS TO ICCS AND ASKED WHETHER GVN WOULD MAKE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION. FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED THAT SINCE NEITHER NORTH VIETNAM NOR PRG CONTRIBUTED ITS FAIR SHARE, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR GVN TO DO SO.

BOTH MR RUSH AND MR HUMMEL EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE TO US AND GVN OF CONTINUANCE OF ICCS DESPITE ITS IMPERFECTIONS. WE HAD COMMUNICATED THIS TO OTHER PARTIES MOST RECENTLY TO INDONESIA TOGETHER WITH OBSERVATION THAT DEMISE OF ICCS WOULD REPRESENT VICTORY FOR NORTH VIETNAM. MR HUMMEL CONCLUDED THEREFORE THAT IT WOULD STRENGTHEN US ABILITY TO PRESS THE OTHER SIDE IF GVN COULD MAKE FURTHER PAYMENT. MR BAC CONCURRED AND STATED HE WOULD MAKE THAT POINT TO THE PRESIDENT. MARTIN

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